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Hong Kong SAR
Hong Kong's Chinese Puzzle
by David Fitzpatrick
* t the stroke of midnight on 30 June 1997, Hong Kong 
L\ was returned to the People's Republic of China. China 
JL JLtakes justifiable pride in the smooth transition; but the 
government in Beijing is now confronted by the demands of 
reality, which include the need to make detailed arrangements 
regulating the ties between the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region and the sovereign power.
MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
Not the least of the problems concerns the degree and means 
by which mutual legal assistance in criminal matters is to be made
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available. The puzzle for the People's Republic is that, wrhile 
Hong Kong's dependent status must involve a high degree of 
mutual co-operation with China, the procedural safeguards that 
exist to govern Hong Kong's co-operation with third 
jurisdictions may not easily be used as a model: they could 
operate so as to exclude the sovereign power. On the other hand, 
if co-operation between Hong Kong and China is to take place 
without clear safeguards, local and international confidence will 
suffer.
Mutual legal assistance is an inevitable consequence of the 
interaction of developed jurisdictions. An extensive trade in 
goods and services, together with a high level of cultural 
exchange and social intercourse, is bound to encourage a high 
degree of integration of each jurisdiction's institutions: a 
corresponding level of integration should be exhibited by each 
trading partner's criminal justice system. Mutual legal assistance 
in civil matters, which underpins trade, will grant the reciprocal 
enforcement of judgments as a minimum. Such arrangements 
exist between most developed countries and the level of co- 
operation usually far exceeds basic assistance by way of reciprocal 
enforcement.
Mutual legal assistance in criminal matters should, as a 
minimum, preclude one jurisdiction from being the place of 
flight for the other's criminal suspects and, in the modern world, 
should also prevent one jurisdiction from becoming a safe base of 
operations for those who would participate in criminal acts 
injurious to the other jurisdiction. It is only in the last 30 years 
that mutual legal assistance in criminal matters has movedO
forward from simple extradition and the rendering of fugitive 
prisoners, to what is the emerging international norm, that is, a 
high degree of co-operation between respective police forces and 
prosecutors against serious crime. This co-operation anticipates 
the selective exchange of intelligence, the gathering andO O ' O O
transmission of official records and documentary evidence, 
securing witness testimony, active assistance in investigations and 
the seizure and confiscation of the fruits of crime. The UK's 
Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 is an example 
of such co-operation between developed jurisdictions.
Close co-operation will only become possible through mutual 
trust. Trust should exist at both the political level and at the 
practical level so that it operates between the key personnel 
involved in making requests and rendering assistance. Each
minister, judge, police officer and lawyer involved should believe 
that the other participant's system is essentially rational, fair and 
staffed by individuals of ability and integrity. That is not to say 
that each participant will need to be perfect but a component of 
the trust is an expectation that imperfections will become clear 
and be remedied. Thus transparency and consistency in relations 
are significant. Where there is a high level of trust, countries 
typically enter into a mutual legal assistance treaty, either 
bilaterally or multilaterally. Alternatively, a lesser form of 
international obligation may be adopted between participants in 
the form of a mutual legal understanding or the mutual 
acceptance of ad hoc arrangements.
MUTUAL UNDERSTANDINGS OR 
ARRANGEMENTS
Such treaties, understandings or arrangements will not be 
absolute: they invariably accommodate the possibility of the 
executive denial of co-operation in specific instances. For 
example, art. IV of the annex to the 1997 agreement between the 
governments of Hong Kong and Australia, which governs mutual 
assistance in criminal matters, contains typical reservations 
whereby either party may refuse a request which might impair its 
essential interests. Thus sovereign integrity and political reality 
may be recognised as co-existing with the hope of a high level of 
cordial co-operation.
Hong Kong is and has for many years been a highly integrated 
participant in world commerce. The People's Republic has not 
yet attained a high level of integration but the Chinese 
government went to great pains to ensure that the present level 
of mutual legal assistance available from Hong Kong in civil 
matters, long established under the British, would be preserved, 
together with the possibility' for development in the future.
In criminal matters, legal co-operation was not as well 
developed and the future appears less certain. Up to the day of 
the handover, Hong Kong was in the position to offer mutual 
legal assistance to a number of countries in the form of 
extradition on the basis of British treaties, together with the 
rendition of fugitive offenders to other CommonwealthO
jurisdictions under UK legislation and administrative 
arrangements that dated from imperial times. Assistance in 
criminal matters was also available in the form of a letter of 
request, whereby a Hong Kong court would assist in the 
examination of a witness identified as having evidence relevant to 
an overseas prosecution. The system was regularly employed and 
worked reasonably well.
This kind of two-way traffic will remain probably strongly 
biased towards co-operation with English speaking jurisdictions 
in which there presently reside large Chinese populations with 
Hong Kong ties. Though the system works, it is apparent that the 
developed world has moved on: Hong Kong will be expected by 
the international community to offer a significantly higher level 
of co-operation, beyond extradition and the taking of evidence, 
introducing the possibility of assistance by the Hong Kong Police 27
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in overseas' investigations, including the seizure of evidence and
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the confiscation of assets. Increasingly co-operation also requires 
each jurisdiction to provide the means whereby a witness in 
detention might travel in secure conditions to give evidence 
outside the jurisdiction in which he or she is imprisoned. Hong 
Kong is the notorious home of at least three powerful 
international crime syndicates and may not easily avoid being 
part of international efforts to curb drug dealing, organised 
crime and money laundering.
Before the handover and anticipating a multiplicity of bilateral 
and multilateral arrangements, there was an obvious need for a 
mutual legal assistance ordinance which would permit Hong 
Kong to participate in a separate capacity from the sovereign 
(whether that sovereign was the UK or the People's Republic of 
China). Separate legal arrangements for Hong Kong are, for the 
time being at least, necessary because the need exists to preserve 
Hong Kong's continuity of co-operation in a manner which is not 
linked or limited to arrangements securing co-operation between 
China and third countries. The criminal justice system of China 
is neither well developed nor clearly understood outside the 
People's Republic. Although China may develop a sound system 
in due course, it is not at present widely perceived as being a 
transparent system that ensures due process.
CRIMINAL MATTERS
Accordingly, shortly before the handover, two pieces of 
legislation were introduced dealing respectively with extradition 
and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. On 26 March 
1997 there was enacted in Hong Kong the Fugitive Offenders 
Ordinance, which came into operation on 25 April 1997. The 
Extradition (Hong Kong) Ordinance (Cap. 236) was repealed and 
the arrangements whereby persons wanted for prosecution (or 
for the imposition of sentence) outside Hong Kong were brought 
together to be dealt with by one uniform process. The ordinance 
contemplates arrangements which permit the ultimate surrender 
of suspects between Hong Kong and other jurisdictions, but not 
the People's Republic of China. The ordinance has been received 
by Hong Kong's legal community without hostile comment.
The Fugitive Offenders Ordinance draws strongly on precedent 
established in the law of extradition. The alleged fugitive has the 
following safeguards:
(1) the requirement of'double criminality' (s. 2(2)(b));
(2) the exclusion of offences of a political character (s. 5(l)(a));
(3) the exclusion of surrender sought for the purpose of 
prosecution on account of race, religion, nationality or 
political opinions (s. 5(2));
(4) the requirement of 'specialty', that is, the offender may only 
be prosecuted in respect of an offence for which he was 
surrendered (s. 5(2));
(5) there would be no re-surrender from the requesting 
jurisdiction without the offender having the opportunity to 
leave that jurisdiction (s. 5(s)).
(6) there would be prima facie evidence sufficient to warrant 
committal for trial in Hong Kong (s. 10(6)(b)(iii)).
At the time of writing (13 January 1998), there are in place ten 
Fugitive Offender Agreements, each made with a third jurisdiction, 
five of which are already in operation. It is anticipated that many 
more will be signed in the next three years.
Despite the handover, China has not yet revealed how and in
what manner it will seek the corresponding rendition of fugitive 
offenders. When Hong Kong was under British rule, no
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arrangements recognised by either sovereign power were in 
operation and no person was ever extradited at the request of the 
People's Republic, neither did Hong Kong seek similar reciprocal 
assistance. These self-imposed limits were of little consequence 
when the only Chinese people who worked in Hong Kong were 
government officials and when Chinese citizens who fled to 
Hong Kong illegally were deported back to China by the Hong 
Kong authorities but now they have become anomalous. In the 
late 1990s, significant numbers of individuals from each 
jurisdiction commute daily for the purpose of business and the 
tourist trade between Hong Kong and China is flourishing. How 
should Hong Kong and China cope with cross-border crime?
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On 26 June 1997, Hong Kong enacted the Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters Ordinance, the greater part of which 
came into operation on 26 September 1997. The ordinance is 
widely cast: under s. 2, there are a range of possible methods of 
assistance that may be offered to jurisdictions outside Hong Kong 
under formal arrangements to be ratified by the Legislative 
Council. Alternatively, under s. 5(4), ad hoc co-operation may be 
given pursuant to requests from third jurisdictions where no 
mutual legal assistance arrangement has been entered into. 
Assistance in both circumstances may be refused on a number of 
grounds, broadly divided into safeguards for the sovereignty of 
Hong Kong and China, safeguards that parallel the Fugitive 
Ojfender provisions and safeguards for the individual in respect of 
compellability in the face of a request requiring testimony. The 
ordinance permits an overseas investigator to seek testimony 
before proceedings have been commenced: the target of the 
investigation is not compellable, but a mere witness has only 
those protections that are available in the jurisdiction of request 
(see s. 6(6) and (7)). At the time of writing, Hong Kong has 
entered into five agreements concerning mutual legal assistance 
in criminal matters with three more (including one with the UK) 
anticipated in the near future.
As with the Fugitive OJJenders Ordinance, the Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters Ordinance precludes the use of the new 
legislation as a framework for co-operation with China. The 
People's Republic did not formally seek assistance from the Royal 
Hong Kong Police (as it then was) before the handover, although 
regular exchanges had taken place between the police in Hong 
Kong and the various police forces in the People's Republic.
No law exists in Hong Kong to prevent an overseas investigator 
from gathering evidence from public sources or from witnesses 
on a voluntary basis. It would also be possible for the Hong Kong 
Police to offer a useful level of assistance to the Chinese by purely 
administrative arrangements. However, without significant legal 
changes, it will not be possible to assist Chinese enquiries by 
securing evidence in Hong Kong, nor is there power to freeze the 
proceeds of crime, nor the power to obtain testimony from an 
unco-operative witness. A similar situation also exists regarding 
civil mutual assistance: except for the case of commercial 
arbitration awards, Hong Kong does not presently enforce 
Chinese civil judgments.
REASSURANCE NEEDED
When China eventually takes steps to establish arrangements, 
it is likely that it will deal with the rendition of fugitives at the 
same time as the wider subject of mutual legal assistance in 
criminal matters. The two naturally go hand in hand. Assistance
given to the Chinese authorities by the Hong Kong Police will be 
a less controversial subject than the matter of rendition of wanted 
persons: China is unlikely to make requests of the Hong Kong 
Police which threaten its own sovereignty or law and order and 
vice versa. How will China reassure Hong Kong citizens or place 
procedural safeguards in the way of the exercise of its own 
sovereign power?
In contrast with extradition to third countries, it is not to be 
expected that the sovereign power would permit its requests to 
its dependent jurisdiction to be challenged in Hong Kong courts 
on the basis of an overriding political motive. Would China also 
seek to avoid in any future arrangement to avoid the 'double 
criminality' requirement that has been for so long a safeguard in 
the field of extradition and which is expressly maintained in the 
Fugitive Offenders Ordinance? The safeguard tests the conduct 
complained of against the criminal law of the requested 
jurisdiction. This is the practical minimum that China should 
offer in any legal arrangements for the rendition of suspects, 
though such a safeguard may thereby offer the possibility that a 
Hong Kong court might need to examine the substantive
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criminal law of the People's Republic. Extradition also requires 
proof, normally in documentary form, of a prima facie case: this 
again could lead to a Hong Kong court examining the means of 
proof relied upon by the Chinese authorities, possibly exposing 
fundamental differences of approach in the ways in which 
evidence is gathered, what is regarded as evidence and how such 
matters are to be weighed by the courts.
Future arrangements for rendition and assistance would 
(presumably) operate alongside the long-established Hong Kong 
administrative practice of deporting those persons who enter 
illegally from China. Keeping this in mind, it should be possible, 
in typical instances of flight after violent crime or crimes of 
dishonesty, for the authorities to deal with the fugitive by 
deportation where the person has entered Hong Kong illegally. A 
similar approach, employing Hong Kong's Immigration Ordinance, 
might be adopted for a Chinese citizen suspected of offences in 
China who has overstayed in Hong Kong or whose right to
residence has been cut short by administrative means. Should 
such practices continue if and when China introduces a legal 
framework by which fugitives are rendered from Hong Kong?
Future rendition arrangements will be brought into critical 
focus should an incident arise whereby China requests the 
rendition of a Hong Kong permanent resident to face a serious 
criminal charge which may carry the possibility of the death 
penalty. Chinese penal provisions are harsh by western standards. 
The local business community will watch developments with 
concern. To imagine a further example, if a charge of fraud 
flowed from a joint venture, Hong Kong investment in ChineseJ ' o o
projects might be slowed. Joint ventures in China often involve 
state organs or are backed by politically powerful individuals.
CONCLUSION
Despite great progress, it has not yet been fully demonstrated 
that China maintains a clear line between the exercise of executive 
power and those matters which are expressed by its substantive law 
and constitution to be within the proper realm of legal remedy. It 
is for this reason above all that any purely administrative system of 
rendition or co-operation for mutual legal assistance would be 
suspect. Most local concerns would be met by a Hong Kong 
ordinance covering the subject of rendition and co-operation with 
China widi the same safeguards that are available to meet requests 
from or co-operation with third jurisdictions   but excluding the 
possibility of questioning the political motive of Chinese requests. 
The future under such arrangements would still present the 
judiciary in China and Hong Kong with great challenges, but 
challenges that can be met and from which both systems may 
emerge beneficially. Any course which avoids such challenges 
would demonstrate a lack of confidence by China's political 




Glass-Steagall on life support
by Kimberley Anne McCoy
Spring   a time of rebirth and the renewal of hope. But for 
commercial bankers, those hopes are typically crushed, as Spring 
represents a time of annual Congressional angst over the future 
of the Glass-Steagall Act 12 USC. The Spring of 1997 was no 
different. While Congress debated whether the 64-year-old legal 
division between commercial and investment banking should 
continue, federal regulators presided over a dramatic end-run 
around the lawmakers. The board of governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, through an order effective from 6 March 1997, 
increased the revenue limits allowed for a s. 20 subsidiary of a 
bank holding company from 10% to 25%. Consequently, the past 
five months witnessed a flurry of acquisition activities as 
commercial banks took advantage of the new regulation.
The recent regulatory reform efforts go some way towards 
dissolving the barrier between commercial and investment
banking. But despite the success and global influence of the US 
banking industry, our banking laws remain anachronistic in 
comparison with other commercial centres. This article focuses 
on one of those antiquated laws, the Glass-Steagall Act. Although 
the regulators' reform efforts have been welcomed by 
commercial bankers, the Glass-Steagall Act will remain in its 
moribund state so long as Congress is unable to make the 
difficult legislative choices necessary to modernize our financial 
services system. The regulator-led piecemeal reform avoids the 
inevitable march of market and technological progress, ultimately 
impacting on the continuing vibrancy of our banking industry. 
This article will examine the Glass-Steagall Act, the regulatory 
efforts to respond to the banking industry's calls for reform and 
the economic price of maintaining the status quo. 29
